The Hon. Sunil Watagala, Attorney-at-Law - Deputy Minister of Public Security and Parliamentary Affairs

¶ 01 Sir, I second the Motion.

¶ 02 Hon. Deputy Speaker, the subject of the Batalanda torture chambers is lengthy, with a long history, and much to be said. Today, we are to speak on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Establishment and Maintenance of Places of Unlawful Detention and Torture Chambers at the Batalanda Housing Scheme. The Commission was appointed on the recommendation of the then Chief Justice, and comprised Commissioner D. Jayawickrama and High Court Judge N.E. Dissanayake. It was established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948, on the warrant issued on 15 December 1995 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Several terms of reference were set, but focusing on one: under paragraph 6(a), the Commission was to inquire into acts of torture, killings and related matters alleged to have occurred between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 1990 at unlawful detention locations within the Batalanda Housing Scheme of the State Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation.

¶ 03 During that period, I was active in the student movement. We well know the fate suffered by many, including not only Wijedasa Liyanarachchi, but also others like Charitha Lankapura and Kanchana Abeypala. Thousands of our comrades were killed for engaging in politics by those who deemed politics a crime. Today we have the opportunity to come before this august House and seek justice on their behalf.

¶ 04 I have studied the Report. Let me begin with its conclusions. The Commission’s findings directly implicate Ranil Wickremesinghe. To avoid running out of time, I will cite the decisions first. Under “Findings” in chapter IX, pages 158-159, it states:

¶ 05 “XIII. Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe (then Minister of Industries and Scientific Affairs) gave directions regarding police operations pertaining to suppressing subversive activities. The Commission is of opinion that Mr. Wickremesinghe had no lawful authority to issue such directions and that he abused his powers. By issuing such directions, Mr. Wickremesinghe interfered with police duties and the enforcement of the law.”

¶ 06 Further, on page 159:

¶ 07 “XIV. Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe and Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police Nalin Delgoda are indirectly responsible for the operation of unlawful detention places and torture chambers at houses B2, B8, B34 and A1/8 of the Batalanda Housing Scheme.”

¶ 08 On page 157:

¶ 09 “IX. During the period 01 January 1988 to 31 December 1990, certain houses at the Batalanda Housing Scheme were used to unlawfully detain persons and to torture them. There is conclusive evidence that the following houses were so used.”

¶ 10 The Report identifies house B2 as belonging to Ranil Wickremesinghe and house B18 to Police Officer Douglas Peiris, and explains the coordinated operations conducted from those premises.

¶ 11 On page 155, it further notes:

¶ 12 “IV. By directing the Superintendent of the State Fertilizer Manufacturing Corporation to hand over the above-mentioned Batalanda Housing Scheme houses to police officers, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe, as Minister of Industries, abused his powers.”

¶ 13 Despite these findings, public narratives attempt to conflate events from 1983 and 1987. The Report itself clarifies, including on page 27 under the heading “JVP banned… violence begins,” that the JVP was banned in 1983, and that violence followed thereafter. The Commission records that in July 1983 President J.R. Jayewardene banned the JVP, Communist Party and NSSP, and that Ranil Wickremesinghe himself agreed in evidence before the Commission that there was no proof that JVP or NSSP activists committed violent acts during the July 1983 riots, and that it could not be established that those parties were responsible.

¶ 14 The Report also details the abduction and death of Attorney-at-Law Wijedasa Liyanarachchi. It records that Ravi Jayewardene, then Security Adviser to the Ministry of Defence and son of President J.R. Jayewardene, informed the IGP on the very day of the abduction that Liyanarachchi might be in the custody of Tangalle Police—raising serious questions about how he knew. The chronology shows Liyanarachchi’s condition deteriorating, his admission to the Colombo National Hospital on 2 September, transfer to ICU, and subsequent death shortly after midnight. The Judicial Medical Officer, Dr. L.B. de Alwis, found death due to shock and haemorrhage from multiple soft tissue and skeletal injuries, documenting about 207 external injuries in addition to many internal injuries.

¶ 15 The Report also links “Gonawala Sunil” (Sunil Perera), a known UNP operative closely associated with Ranil Wickremesinghe, to violent activities, including attacks such as on the Sapugaskanda Police Station, as set out around page 104. Photographic evidence and testimonies placed him in close proximity to Mr. Wickremesinghe and at Batalanda during the relevant period.

¶ 16 These are not my opinions; they are the Commission’s findings. The Penal Code conspiracy provisions apply where multiple actors agree or contribute towards the commission of offences. Those who orchestrated, directed or facilitated must be held accountable. We owe justice to the countless who suffered in torture chambers across the country, not only Batalanda. We pledge to pursue accountability.

¶ 17 Thank you.