The Hon. Mujibur Rahman

¶ 01 Thank you very much, Hon. Amila Prasad.

¶ 02 Hon. Presiding Member, in 2023 tenders were called for this project. Two companies remained at the final stage. Of them, the lowest bid was by Madras Security Printers. However, that company faced serious allegations. There were major issues related to issuing stickers for liquor bottles, which led to heavy opposition, and the previous government cancelled awarding that tender. When a tender is cancelled, what should happen? A fresh tender must be called. But now, the project has been awarded. Was a tender called? I ask the Minister. The previous government cancelled the tender and that was the end of it—so was a new tender called? To my knowledge, no new tender has been called. If no tender was called, how was this project awarded? What was the procedure?

¶ 03 As I understand, there was another process. During the President’s visit to India, it appears an understanding was reached to give the project to an Indian company. Prime Minister Modi did not casually hold the President’s hand; having done so and after that engagement, this is one of the outcomes. At a press briefing, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wijitha Herath, stated that as requested by India—meaning to award this project to a company from India—there was an expression of willingness. This was reported in The Sunday Times.

¶ 04 So what are we doing? We are handing over our data to anyone. What protection exists? On the one hand, India grants Rs. 4 billion as assistance for this project, and on the other hand, an Indian company is to execute it. With Rs. 4 billion in aid from India, then India says their company should take the project. Then the money goes back to India, and our data goes to India. I do not understand the transparency here, nor the assurances regarding the protection of our citizens’ data. In my view, this is a very serious issue.

¶ 05 If an Indian company is executing this project, to what extent and in which locations will they operate? What is the scope and reach of this work?

¶ 06 The President, on a private TV program, said that the data-entry component would be done by a Sri Lankan company. Which Sri Lankan company is that? Was there a proper tender process to entrust that task to a local company? Was a tender called? How was the local company selected? There is great silence on this. That is why we raise it. Collecting our biometric data is a grave matter, Hon. Presiding Member. The world today runs on data; data can be sold; data can be used for various purposes; data can be used to undertake various actions. Therefore, the collection of our biometric data must not be treated as a simple matter. It is serious.

¶ 07 On that same private TV interview, the President said he asked us to trust him. He also asked us to trust Mr. Hans Wijayasuriya, citing his subject-matter knowledge on digitalization. How can the President give a character certificate for Hans Wijayasuriya? Can he do that? The President can ask us to trust him, as he was elected by the people—that is fine. But Hans Wijayasuriya is not in the same category. How can the President come on television and say, “Do not trust me; trust Hans Wijayasuriya”? How can we hand over data based on such a claim? Remember, when he was CEO of Dialog, during the investigation into the murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge, the required telephone numbers were not provided. The very person the President cites—his economic advisor—was then Dialog’s CEO. He withheld information by not providing essential telephone numbers relevant to that murder inquiry. If the President asks us to trust such individuals, that is deeply problematic.

¶ 08 Our concern is not with his expertise; on the subject he may be among the most knowledgeable in Sri Lanka. The issue is how they acted while leading major companies. In a grave case of homicide in this country, when call data was requested, it was not provided. They had strong connections with the then rulers and their family, and therefore did not release the information. To ask us to overlook credibility concerns in entrusting the biometric data of 22 million people is unacceptable, Hon. Presiding Member. This is a very serious matter.

¶ 09 National Identity Cards were introduced in 1972. In 1988-89, certain groups collected identity cards. Why? Because identity cards can be used as an instrument of repression. If that is so, why are we collecting biometric data now? Biometrics can also be used against us. My fingerprints can be misused; someone could frame me. That is the gravity here. Nineteen countries have implemented such systems, but tell me one where there has been no biometrics leak—every country has had leaks. Therefore, we call for a social dialogue. This cannot be rushed. We ask the Government to initiate a social dialogue and consult domain experts, not only a single advisor. There are many knowledgeable people—seek their views and do not rush.

¶ 10 Hon. Presiding Member, all equipment needed for NIC digitalization has reportedly been procured. The Automated Biometric Identification System has been purchased. We want to know how these procurements were made—was there a tender process? How were the tenders called and awarded?

¶ 11 Also, the Controller General of Immigration and Emigration was remanded during the previous government’s time due to a Supreme Court case filed by three of our Samagi Jana Balawegaya MPs—M. A. Sumanthiran, Rauff Hakeem and Champika Ranawaka. It was not this government that sent him in.