The Hon. (Dr.) Anil Jayantha - Minister of Labour and Deputy Minister of Finance and Planning

¶ 01 Hon. Presiding Member, upon learning that USD 2.5 million, due to Export Finance Australia, had been diverted to a third party, we immediately took steps and clarified actions undertaken. Several investigations are ongoing through the CID. Unfortunately, partial and incorrect information has been circulated, misleading the public. Today’s debate is on this.

¶ 02 Two elements are relevant: (1) the USD 2.5 million purportedly paid to Export Finance Australia (EFA), and (2) the attempted interference via emails in a similar Indian EXIM Bank payment stream.

¶ 03 Background: In bilateral debt restructuring, we sign detailed agreements stipulating covenants, schedules and designated accounts. The EFA-related agreement was circulated on 27 Oct 2025 by ERD officer Ranga Rajapaksha (now, sadly, deceased). On 10 Nov, responses were received; invoices were sent; the process involves ERD issuing to the Public Debt Management Office, then to the Central Bank for payment via designated accounts. In November and early January, multiple vouchers—ten in all—were processed within this chain for a total of USD 2.5 million. Whether issues arose in those specific November and January payments is under investigation.

¶ 04 Separately, a similar bilateral payment to India’s EXIM Bank was being coordinated by another officer. She detected an anomaly: a single letter in an email—“Bank” misspelled as “Benk.” She raised suspicions, contacted the correct Indian EXIM counterparts by phone, and ensured the payment was correctly made. She also halted a suspicious attempted diversion. This “triggered” our wider probe. She had no knowledge of the EFA chain handled by Ranga. Immediately, SLCERT and the Police Cyber Crimes Unit were notified, and multi-agency meetings were held with ERD and the Department of Information Technology Management.

¶ 05 Consequently, we examined whether already-processed transactions had been affected. Through inquiries, it emerged—via the Australian High Commission—that the USD 2.5 million to EFA had not been received. This related to vouchers in November and early January, traced back after March 22 when the anomaly was identified. On March 22, we notified SLCERT; the CID was engaged; on March 24, a five-member technical committee (including two Deputy Treasury Secretaries) was appointed. Based on preliminary findings, four to five officers linked to the chain—including, for one, the use of her email while on maternity leave—were identified. On April 10, transfers were effected to facilitate investigation; on April 17, they were interdicted.

¶ 06 This is ongoing. We must present facts as confirmed by investigations, not run with half-truths. Contrary to rumors, the deceased officer did not make the CID complaint; the ERD Director-General did. We commenced inquiries within two days of discovery. Compare this with earlier episodes—fertilizer shipments, cattle imports—where foreign exchange losses remained unprobed for years. Under this Government, probes proceed, and culpable parties—whoever they may be—will face the law.

¶ 07 There has been other misinformation—for example, claims of a fresh insurance “bond scam” or VAT manipulations—completely false. On the debt front, rumors were spread that French restructuring instruments had gone missing—again baseless. Investigate and present facts; aid the probes rather than mislead the public.

¶ 08 We have also engaged academic expertise, including from the University of Colombo, to assist the technical inquiry, given the cyber elements. We will present outcomes to the House. Let us all act responsibly: support clean governance, reject falsehoods, and allow law enforcement and technical panels to conclude their work. There is no basis to allege Government complicity. I categorically reject that.

¶ 09 Thank you.