The Hon. Anuradha Jayaratne, Attorney-at-Law

¶ 01 Hon. Deputy Speaker, I rise to support and comment on the Adjournment Motion moved by the Hon. Rohini Kumari Wijerathna, calling for a proper plan regarding the national situation arising from Cyclone “Ditwah”.

¶ 02 First, we requested the appointment of a Select Committee to gather facts, develop a plan, and determine how to act in future crises. However, the composition proposed—eight Government Members and four Opposition Members—makes it appear designed to shut the book on accountability, as if asking the wrongdoer’s mother whether the child did wrong. We cannot endorse that. Our intent is not mudslinging; we seek to learn and fix shortcomings.

¶ 03 Gampola was one of the hardest-hit cities. On the second day, it was said the Kotmale Dam had cracked and people panicked about a possible breach, yet they did not know where to evacuate. A Select Committee could ensure practical planning: What is the evacuation plan for each dam? In an emergency, where should people go? But if a committee is structured to suppress issues, how can we improve? We must learn lessons from “Ditwah”.

¶ 04 On water management: the Director at the Water Management Secretariat, Mr. Nilantha Dhanapala—an experienced officer who chaired the technical committee—was removed months ago and replaced by a junior, Mr. Manoj Perera, as Head of the Technical Team. This is a grave error. Not all dams have automated gates. We all know when Kotmale releases water, an SMS indicates it will reach Rantambe in about 2 hours 40 minutes. Coordination via timely communication is crucial. Instead, an inexperienced officer was placed over a complex system, contributing to mismanagement.

¶ 05 Normally, if catchment rainfall is around 300 mm in a period, controlled pre-releases should commence. That protocol was not followed; storage was allowed to accumulate, and then six gates were opened hurriedly. After the panic release, Kotmale water level reportedly fell 1.5 metres below the prior flood crest, indicating excessive flushing beyond what was needed—evidence of mismanagement. If maximum discharge capacity is 5,500 m³/s at Kotmale, why were only about 1,800 m³/s released during critical hours on the 27th night while towns downstream went under? We need a serious, facts-based inquiry—not blame games—to fix operations.

¶ 06 We must question where the EICs (Engineers-in-Charge) were—those bearing responsibility for specific dams. Were the appointed officers fulfilling their duties on the ground? These are matters a genuinely empowered committee should probe so that we are not caught unprepared again.

¶ 07 We also need an independent, empowered disaster authority. In the U.S., FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) can convene all relevant officials and enforce planning and communication. Here, District Secretaries were unaware of 400–500 mm rainfall events; the Disaster Management Centre did not coordinate boats pre-positioning; political leaders were not effectively briefed. Study FEMA and introduce reforms to make our Disaster Management Centre an independent authority with statutory teeth, ensuring timely, unified communication—tsunami, extreme rainfall, and landslide risks alike—and involving District Secretaries, local authorities, and city councils in operational planning.

¶ 08 Misinformation must be countered: claims that “Ambuluwawa” caused the flooding in Gampola are baseless. The Ambuluwawa Trust-managed 112 hectares did not record intrusions of the major landslides into that area over the seven days concerned.

¶ 09 On investment allegations around cable-car projects and Ambuluwawa: in 2022, amid a Treasury with only USD 10 million reserves, we secured a USD 12.75 million investment, of which USD 3.5 million has already arrived. Allegations linking my family are unfounded; investigate anything you wish, but do not derail beneficial projects by rumor. As for Ambuluwawa revenues, before I chaired, 2019 revenue was Rs. 11 million; 2020, Rs. 13 million; subsequently, revenues increased to Rs. 288 million (2021), Rs. 55 million (2022), Rs. 123 million (2023), and Rs. 286 million (2024), multiplying 21-fold. Asset value rose from Rs. 37.4 million to approximately Rs. 1.2 billion, and over Rs. 1,000 lakhs were paid in taxes. These are measurable outcomes.

¶ 10 In sum, investigate properly, build a new actionable plan, and create an independent disaster authority empowered for swift, coordinated response.