The Hon. Kumara Jayakody

¶ 01 In selecting the Norochcholai power plant unloading arrangements, a key factor was ignored. Issues begin from land selection. Within about eight months only can we do the stockpiling, and only one vessel can unload at a time as the jetty is not stationary and is offshore. Back-to-back unloading is not feasible. Because coal from the previous corrupt deals was in the yard from September until 7 December, we could not unload new coal until then. If deliveries came in December, we could only start the new chain at end-December.

¶ 02 As an Hon. Member also said, the supplier brought the first cargo by 30 December. As of today, the ninth vessel is unloading coal; the tenth is in the anchorage; the eleventh is on the way; the twelfth and thirteenth have coal en route. The chain is functioning continuously. There is no delay here. The delays were in the prior contracts. People shouting here seem to know nothing. Low-size or “poor quality” coal came even in 2014; this is not unprecedented. In some years, even a 5 per cent penalty was not recovered; in some years over USD 8 million remained uncollected during their governments. There is no delay on our watch.

¶ 03 On damages: we examined this. Plant engineers have reported no tube failures so far. Although higher ash can, in the long run, cause boiler tube erosion, the extent requires detailed studies such as comparative surface microstructure analysis; you cannot decide by scribbling on paper. Therefore, without a comprehensive reliability assessment and adequate historical data, the long-term impact of low-grade coal cannot be quantitatively evaluated.

¶ 04 The minimum recorded capacity during these shipments was 265 MW, within the OEM’s safe operating range and above part-load levels maintained during solar curtailments. Accordingly, there is no evidence of adverse impact on the turbine from these shipments. Additional maintenance costs like air-preheater cleaning or blockage removal can be assessed if properly recorded. To date, no such issues have been observed, and further operational data is being collected.

¶ 05 Emission downstream of the FGD unit is continuously monitored by the Ambient Air Quality Monitoring System. Recorded data show no significant increase or any FGD problem during these coal shipments. Claims that equipment was damaged and needed repairs are not borne out by the plant’s data. Ambient air quality has not deteriorated. Quoting “ash content” alone proves nothing. We say this with reference to the operating data and third-party checks by a national institution.

¶ 06 On air pollution metrics during the period: - PM2.5 limit: 50 µg/m³; observed 21–27 µg/m³. - PM10 limit: 100 µg/m³; observed consistently below that, e.g., 38, 35, 73 µg/m³. - CO: 8-hour limit 9,000 ppb; 24-hour data not applicable; max observed 8,868 ppb. - NO2 limit: 50 ppb; observed 3.3, 5.6, 3.8 ppb. - SO2 limit: 30 ppb; observed 9.1, 5.7, 6 ppb.

¶ 07 So, rather than technical buzzwords, let us investigate facts. We are conducting inquiries. There is no evidence of manipulation or intentional wrongdoing. Historically there were issues with procurement and acceptance: until about 2015, 100 per cent payment was made on Load Port Reports alone; only thereafter were checks begun at discharge—an evolving process. We will study further and resolve issues, mindful of Sri Lanka’s grid situation. We have issued necessary instructions through the Ministry Secretary for enhanced testing and identification going forward.

¶ 08 As for OEM recommendations, operation is typically in the 250–300 MW range per unit; our shipments supported around 265 MW, thus no loss arose on that basis.

¶ 09 Regarding turbine blades supposedly damaged by coal: this is technically absurd. Coal never reaches the turbine. Coal heats water in the boiler; steam drives the turbine. If coal reached the turbine that would be a different problem entirely. Historically, since 2011, Unit 1 frequently tripped; last year it went down more than four times. On average last year, more than one of the three units was not in operation. So it is not only coal; there are broader plant reliability issues we are also probing. We exclude nothing from review.

¶ 10 Our current procurement procedures and supplier selections follow due process. Previously, ad hoc Cabinet Papers without process were the norm. Had a proper tender been run in 2022, coal would still be at USD 328/MT as decided then—the only “good” tender according to some—which the Audit Report itself criticized. Many of those responsible were removed; we are correcting the process and have provided directions accordingly.

¶ 11 On direct feeding: we have operated above 2,250 MW for many days. Limits of 2,250–2,300 MW are applied, especially daytime, due to high solar penetration. I have all the details. The situation is not as problematic as claimed.

¶ 12 There is a clear penalty framework in contracts. For example, if GCV falls below 5,900 kcal/kg within the 5,900–6,150 band, penalties increase—double if below 5,900—per formula. We often seek higher-end coal quality than most countries (many seek ~4,000 GCV). Fewer suppliers can meet it, leading to variability and hence international penalty conditions, not ones we invented. We will keep refining terms.

¶ 13 Hon. Minister, we have to suspend for lunch.

¶ 14 Finally, we have not altered procurement processes or supplier selection methods unlawfully. If at any time a contract defaults, we will enforce it then. We act lawfully. Thank you.