The Hon. Vijitha Herath - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism

¶ 01 Mr. Speaker, I wish to present some observations on last month’s 60th Session of the Human Rights Council and the resolution adopted on Sri Lanka.

¶ 02 First, this is not the first time a resolution on Sri Lanka has been adopted at the Human Rights Council. In the 1980s and after the end of the war in 2009, the present Council and its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, adopted a number of resolutions regarding the war and other human rights violations in Sri Lanka. Since 2009, there have been eleven such resolutions: in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021, 2022, 2024 and the one adopted now. Governments at those times adopted different policies toward them. At times, they supported and even co-sponsored resolutions (notably in 2015, 2017 and 2019). At other times (2012, 2013, 2014, 2021 and 2022), they went for votes. In 2009, the Government itself presented a resolution. There were also times they opposed only certain paragraphs without calling a vote.

¶ 03 Across all these, two common points emerge. First, the national issues underlying the Geneva process were not properly managed by successive governments. That is the principal reason why these resolutions have continued for over 16 years. In any conflict, human rights issues arise; many countries address them domestically and advance national reconciliation. Our past governments, however, deepened ethnic, racial and religious divisions and curtailed the rights of all peoples, making Sri Lanka internationally distrusted. The evolution of the Geneva resolutions shows this clearly.

¶ 04 The 2009 resolution’s key call was to implement a sustainable national solution addressing the concerns of all communities, as promised by the then President to the UN High Commissioner. That did not happen. Three years later, in 2012, another resolution called for implementing recommendations of the Government’s own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). That too was not implemented. In 2013, another resolution again called for LLRC implementation and for a national commission for truth and reconciliation. Instead of implementing its own LLRC and promoting reconciliation, the then Government cynically used human rights and the Geneva process for narrow politics—even to the point where, during the 2013 visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, their Ministers made absurd “marriage proposals” to her, as you would recall.

¶ 05 By politicizing issues and misleading the public, those governments undermined confidence that Sri Lanka could resolve human rights issues domestically. Consequently, in 2021, the Office of the High Commissioner established a special unit to collect evidence regarding alleged violations in Sri Lanka: the Sri Lanka Accountability Project. As our proverb says, do not cut with a sword what can be cut with a needle; this could have been resolved domestically soon after the war but was internationalized by short-sighted leadership.

¶ 06 When President Anura Kumara Dissanayake took office in September 2024 and our Government assumed office in October 2024, this deterioration had already occurred. The People across all regions, ethnicities, and religions gave us a strong mandate to end poverty, eliminate corruption, and build a united country. We aim to de-internationalize the human rights process by ensuring the rights of all and resolving issues through strong, independent domestic institutions. We have already taken several significant steps in this direction.

¶ 07 Second, given the composition and workings of the Council, it is challenging for a country like Sri Lanka to win votes. Unlike the UN General Assembly where all 193 states vote, the HRC has only 47 members at any time, allocated regionally. Some regional groups—e.g., Europe—often act cohesively, making defeat of their sponsored resolutions rare. Since 2009, we won a vote only once—our own 2009 resolution. In subsequent votes on Sri Lanka, the Government’s position was defeated, with our support dwindling over time and more abstentions. In 2012 we obtained 15 of 47; in 2013, 13; in 2014, 12; in 2021, 11; in 2022, 7. Yet previous governments spent millions of public funds on futile lobbying trips and delegations to Geneva, despite knowing they would lose—thereby further shrinking the space to bring this issue back to the domestic arena.

¶ 08 Mr. Speaker, regarding this year’s 60th Session: I addressed the Council’s March Session after our Government took office, outlining steps through our national mechanisms to protect the economic and political rights of all Sri Lankans, reject ethnic and religious divisive politics, and build national reconciliation. In June this year, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Volker Türk, visited Sri Lanka—the first such visit in about a decade and at the Government’s invitation less than a year after we took office. He engaged openly with the President, Government, religious leaders, the public, civil society and political parties, and witnessed the actual situation. He made positive observations on the Government’s genuine openness, the appetite for progressive change, and the start Sri Lanka has made to resolve issues through domestic mechanisms. His September report to the 60th Session also reflected these positive views, urging Sri Lanka to use this historic opportunity to resolve issues through strong domestic mechanisms. I table the Government’s response to his report.

¶ 09 Before the resolution was adopted, the High Commissioner met the President and me in New York during UNGA for constructive discussions as well.

¶ 10 As I said, the Geneva process on Sri Lanka was internationalized by 2021. Resolution 46/1 created the Sri Lanka Accountability Project within the OHCHR to collect evidence on alleged violations. As Minister, both in March and September, I clearly stated in the Council that Sri Lanka does not accept such non-domestic mechanisms. While we reject international mechanisms, we are working to build consensus to resolve issues through our own independent domestic processes. This cannot be done in a few months, but we are laying the foundation. The Council recognizes our commitment. We are strengthening institutions central to human rights and the rule of law, including the judiciary. The Offices on Missing Persons, Reparations, and National Unity and Reconciliation are being strengthened and made independent. We have repealed the Prevention of Terrorism Act—which, though introduced for emergencies, was still in force 16 years after the war—and will soon introduce a new counter-terrorism law consistent with international conventions and safeguarding human rights. We plan human-rights–enhancing amendments to the Online Safety law.

¶ 11 Back in 2009, the JVP proposed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address war-related human rights issues. Had that national commission been established and its recommendations implemented, there would likely be no Geneva resolution today. Sixteen years later, as we take office, it has still not been done. We therefore aim soon to pass a Truth and Reconciliation law and commence the Commission’s work. The Government also plans to establish an Independent Public Prosecutor’s Office. We are not taking these steps for Geneva’s sake but because, as a movement long subjected to state repression and rights violations, and out of genuine compassion for victims among all communities, we are committed to human rights.

¶ 12 Let me be clear: these steps are not aimed at targeting soldiers who ended the war or any community. Protecting human rights, ensuring the rule of law, building reconciliation, and preventing a return to conflict is our collective responsibility.

¶ 13 Some media reported that the 06th October resolution on Sri Lanka was adopted without a vote. As I explained, calling a vote often indicates a contentious situation. Unlike past governments that wasted public funds grandstanding in doomed votes, our policy is not to engage in such theatrics. On 06 October, when the resolution was presented, our Permanent Representative clearly stated Sri Lanka’s position. I table my statement of 08 September and the statement of our Permanent Representative of 06 October.

¶ 14 Comparing this resolution with prior ones, there are several positive features. It acknowledges Sri Lanka’s democratic transition, steps to address the economic crisis, anti-corruption measures, and the national program for reconciliation and human rights. It provides space for domestic institutions to resolve issues. However, as a continuation of the 2021 resolution, its final paragraph extends the Sri Lanka Accountability Project. As this is not a domestic mechanism, our Government rejects it, as we emphasized on 06 October. It will only deepen divisions and obstruct our domestic program. Based on our domestic progress and the growing confidence among Council members, we believe the Accountability Project can be brought to an end in the near future, enabling us to resolve our issues ourselves. Notably, among those speaking for the core group that presented the resolution, the UK also acknowledged the Government’s significant progress. Beyond the core group, a number of Council members—from China, Bangladesh, Maldives, Cuba, Japan, South Korea, the EU, Ethiopia, Costa Rica and others—praised Sri Lanka’s progress. In the 08 September dialogue, some 43 countries spoke, almost all welcoming our domestic steps. Our aim is not to instrumentalize people’s rights for parochial politics by invoking a “Geneva demon or deity,” but to protect the rights of our own people.

¶ 15 Protecting our people’s rights is not a favour to be showcased in this House; it is our paramount duty as representatives. As the President has stated, we share the dream of a peaceful and prosperous country where all Sri Lankans live together in freedom. We are committed to making that dream a reality, by engaging constructively with all stakeholders and the international community for our future generations. I now table all relevant documents and the English version of my speech.

¶ 16 Thank you, Mr. Speaker.