The Hon. Najith Indika

¶ 01 Hon. Deputy Speaker, before my prepared remarks, I will respond to a senior Opposition Member who, over the last two days, claimed that the NPP fueled social hatred during the campaign. We answered that already. Our critique of 76 years of misrule and economic collapse is not hate speech; it is an accurate accounting of what happened. Those who spread social hatred are the ones who said, “If they win, there will be bloodshed; the country will become a pool of blood; religions will be abolished; Kathina and peraheras will vanish; Muslims will be forced to shave their beards.” That is hate. They must own what they said. We stand by what we did.

¶ 02 The Opposition keeps saying we are “going on Ranil’s path.” Let us recall what that path was, and then show the path we are on. Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s governing periods can be seen as: (1) 1977–1994 under JR and Premadasa, during which he held various portfolios; (2) 2001–2003 as Prime Minister; (3) 2015–2019 as Prime Minister in the “good governance” administration; (4) mid-2022 to September 2024 as President.

¶ 03 In 1989, as Minister of Industries, what did he do? Under T. B. Subasinghe in 1975, Sri Lanka began its first (and still only) urea/fertilizer plant, supported by the ADB as a second investment to complement the Mahaweli project. Four years into construction, the government changed. The UNP government under JR and Ranil argued that given global prices and local costs, it was uneconomic, and—on ADB advice—closed it for five years pending market conditions. But it remained shut and was dismantled. As senior journalist Nandana Weeraratne records in “We Set Batalanda on Fire,” valuable machinery was auctioned as scrap; an Indian company (SPIC) took the plant to Jebel Ali in the UAE and produced urea to sell back to Sri Lanka. The 1975 investment cost Rs. 6,000 million, which we now spend annually importing fertilizer. That was Ranil’s path.

¶ 04 Debt exploded: in 1976, domestic debt was Rs. 12.6 billion; foreign debt Rs. 4.98 billion; total Rs. 17.68 billion (58.5% of GDP). By 1978, total rose to Rs. 30.9 billion (72.6% of GDP), and by 1989 to 108.7% of GDP. Thereafter, privatization accelerated: from 1991, 48 state enterprises sold under Ranil/DB Wijetunga; 46 more under President Chandrika; from 2002’s “Regaining Sri Lanka,” profitable entities, including Sri Lanka Insurance, were sold (later reversed by court). This selling spree continued, regardless of sectoral importance.

¶ 05 In the last two years, again, the policy was to sell everything—CEB, petroleum, and more—piecemeal. A CEB restructuring law to sell off remaining transmission and distribution shares was passed; within six weeks of assuming office, our President halted that course. Restructuring for efficiency is needed, but not by selling the grid.

¶ 06 We differ from Ranil’s path fundamentally. The NPP proposed a distinct, principle-based economic strategy—state-led planning with private and cooperative sectors, retaining sovereign control over strategic utilities like power, while mobilizing private investment under clear national plans. That is why we won 159 seats; neither SJB nor SLPP presented a path fundamentally different from Ranil’s.

¶ 07 We face a rice market issue now; had Ranil’s path continued, tomorrow it would be electricity, then fuel. We will tackle these with different policies. The people mandated change because they rejected 1977-onward neoliberal orthodoxy that led us into bankruptcy. Our President’s programme and our pre-election policy documents clearly explain how we diverge—on rule of law, political culture, and especially economic fundamentals. We make no secret promises; we stated what is doable, and we are implementing that.

¶ 08 Thank you.